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ABSTRACT
The rapid advancement in wireless technology along with their low cost and ease
of deployment have been attracting researchers academically and commercially.
Researchers from private and public sectors are investing into enhancing the reliability,
robustness, and security of radio frequency (RF) communications to accommodate the
demand and enhance lifestyle. RF base communications -by nature- are slower and more
exposed to attacks than a wired base (LAN). Deploying such networks in various cuttingedge mobile platforms (e.g. VANET, IoT, Autonomous robots) adds new challenges that
impact the quality directly. Moreover, adopting such networks in public outdoor areas
make them vulnerable to various attacks (regardless of the attacker motive). Therefore, the
quality and security of the communications cannot be neglected especially when
developing outdoor wireless applications/networks.
While some wireless applications and platforms aim to provide comfort and
infotainment, others are more critical to protect and save lives. Thus, the need for mobile
broadband connections has been increased to accommodate such applications. The FCC
took the first step to regulate and assure the quality when using these technologies by
allocating spectrums and issuing standards and amendments (e.g. IEEE802.11a, b, g, n,
and p) to deliver reliable and secure communications.
In this dissertation, we introduce several problems related to the security and quality
of communications in outdoor environments. Although we focus on the ISM-RF bands
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UHF and SHF (licensed and unlicensed) and their applications when solving quality and
security issues nevertheless, the concept of propagating signals through the air for
communications remain the same across other ISM bands. Therefore, problems and their
solutions in this work can be applied to different wireless technologies with respect to
environment and mobility.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Technologies have been evolving rapidly over the last decade. In particular,
wireless (Radio Frequency-RF) communications have been gaining a wide interest from
governments, researchers, and companies. The low cost along with ease of deployment and
maintenance, have made wireless technology a fruitful research field academically and
commercially.
Nowadays, different forms of wireless communications can be seen everywhere.
Smart phones, computers, televisions, appliances, aerial vehicles and even cars have been
manufactured and employed with wireless capabilities. When wireless technology was first
discovered, it used to be a luxury not everyone can afford. Nowadays, their affordability,
capability, and reliability have made the new era moves toward utilizing the technology to
lower expenses and provide safety in almost every field (military, health, industry,
education ...etc.)
In 2009, US-DOT released a statistical analysis showing that cars are the leading
cause of death for people ages between 4 to 34 years old. Statistics showed that more than
33000 deaths and 5,800,000 crashes per year in addition to over $78 billion cost of urban
congestion are caused by vehicles [20]. Although several studies have investigated threats
on roads and tried to propose solutions based on the cause of accidents (human,
environment, or vehicle –related), the US-DOT have acknowledged cars impact on
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economy and people’s safety which led the department to conclude that roads are no longer
as safe to drive on as used to.
The new era is moving toward employing wireless communications to make cars
intelligent to save resources (financially), enhance safety of drivers, and provide comfort.
Therefore, car manufacturers and governments have been cooperating and investing into
proposing new solutions. In the early 2000s, Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) was
only seen as a one-to-one application of Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET). Since then,
VANET have been developed into research field until officially introduced earlier in 2005.
The unique property of VANET is the collaboration between vehicles and networks
technologies. Therefore, VANET has attracted cars manufacturers, governments,
researchers, and companies. As a result of these efforts, VANET was proposed and
standardized by IEEE group over the globe. Consequently, cars’ manufacturers started
investing to research and produce “wireless cars”. For instance, Volkswagen has enabled
their cars to talk to each other [64], while Google have successfully made a fully automated
car that can drive and park itself [65]. Moreover, Cadillac (General Motors’ Company) has
promised to release its first vehicle equipped with ITS (Intelligent Transport System) using
DSRC (Dedicated Short-Range Communication) in late-2015 [66].
While VANET has been gaining popularity, its security and privacy have been a
concern. Since drivers’ safety is the ultimate goal behind proposing VANET, many
security risks needed to be addressed to ensure the normal operation of the network and
hence, enhance safety on roads. Typical issues such as the reliability and availability of the
network in highly changeable mobile environment have been addressed however; they are
yet to be finalized. Although VANET shows a potential enhancement of safety and comfort
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on roads, the new technology (based on inserting Wireless Access in Vehicle Environment
WAVE) is still vulnerable to most of attacks that work against radio frequency
communications. Yet, the great potential of the technology led to the development of many
VANET-based applications and deployment by IT-companies, governments (e.g, tollcollections), and cars’ manufacturers (e.g, traffic congestion and emergency vehicle
warning systems).
Since drivers’ safety is the main goal behind proposing VANET, and it is dependent
on the successful delivery of early warning messages. Therefore, establishing and
maintaining reliable communications links between nodes is crucial and challenging due
to the nature of RF-communications (using wireless medium as communications mean).
Moreover, the characteristics of the outdoor environment (encompass high mobility of
nodes, irregular surrounding noise, and unpredictable weather phenomena), has made
VANET a challenging research field.
Here we focus on the security aspect of VANET. We investigate the feasibility of
launching intentional interference (jamming) attack to disrupt the normal operation of the
network. We analyze the security risks caused by intentional interference attacks in outdoor
mobile environments from message delivery aspect. We also provide a low-latency
jamming detection solution to solve the intentional interference problem in outdoor mobile
environment.

1.1 VANET OVERVIEW
Since VANET was proposed earlier in 2005, many terminologies and acronyms have
been used that refer to the same technology concept (vehicular networking). Although these
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terms may differ in technical low-level details, but generally they are the same. The most
commonly found terms are:
• ITS (Intelligent Transport Systems)
• IVC (Inter-Vehicle Communication)
• DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication)
• WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicle Environment)
Throughout this dissertation we may use variety of these terms to refer to the same
technology except when explicitly stated.
VANET consists of two types of wireless nodes. The combination of i) cars equipped with
wireless capabilities, ii) and infrastructures towers like nodes forms a VANET. This allows
communications among and between Infrastructures (Road-Side nodes) and cars (mobile
nodes) Fig.1.1. By doing so, many VANET based applications were proposed and
developed to serve the ultimate goal of VANET (enhancing safety and comfort on road).
These applications can be categorized based on their serviceability into: i) Safety, ii)
Traffic Management, and iii) Maintenance & Comfort enhancement -applications
Table.1.1. While some of these applications are developed to provide comfort and
infotainments, some others can save lives and money.

Figure 1.1: Nodes’ and Communications’ Types in VANET
4

Table 1.1: Examples of some VANET Based Applications
VANET Based Applications
Safety

Traffic Management

Maintenance and Comfort

Traffic Signal Violation Warning

Highway Merge Assistance

Safety Recall Notice

Stop Sign Violation Warning

Cooperative Cruise Control

Just-in-time repair notification

Left-Turn Assistance

Cooperative Platooning

Wireless Diagnosis

Intersection Collision Warning

Fleet Management
Adaptive Speed Limit
Based on Road Conditions
HAZMAT Cargo Tracking
Electronic Toll Payment

Electronic Driver License

Visibility Enhancer
Cooperative glare
reduction/Headlamp aiming
Parking Spot Locator
GPS Correction
Instant Messaging Between
Vehicles
Mobile Access to Vehicle data

Stolen Vehicle Tracking

POI Notification

SOS Services

Fueling Info.

Pedestrian Crossing Information
Emergency Vehicles
Vehicle Safety Inspection
Electronic License Plate

Pre-Crash Sensing
Road Condition Warning

1.2

STANDARDS AND SPECTRUM
VANET has been recognized globally, and different regions have allocated

different spectrum, frequencies, and transmission ranges. Table.1.2 summarizes the global
spectrum allocation dedicated for VANET uses in different regions.
Table 1.2: DSRC/WAVE GLOBAL SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
Region

Frequency (MHz)

Band

Range

North America (US)

5850 – 5925

75 MHz

1000 m

Japan
Europe

5770 - 5850
5795 - 5815

80 MHz
20 Mhz

30 m
15 – 20 m

In October 1999, the U.S. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) released an
official announcement of allocating 75MHz spectrum in 5.9GHz range for Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS) uses, which empowered by wireless communications Fig.1.2.
The announcement dictates the FCC decision to use 5.850-5.925GHz band for a variety of
5

Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) uses to create more robust environment
with higher noise resistance compared to the current 2.4GHz. [7]-[12]

Figure.1.2: Spectrum Allocation for VANET Communications
DSRC/WAVE consists of a set of IEEE1609 standards for wireless access in
vehicular environment. It is important to distinguish between the former DSRC standard
in 915MHz range (used primarily in ETC applications), and the wireless access in
Vehicular Environment (WAVE) standard approved for the current 5,9 GHz DSRC band
Table.1.3.
Table.1.3: DSRC 915MHz Vs. 5.9 GHz Comparison
Parameter

915 MHz

5.9 GHz

Used Spectrum (MHz)

12

75

Data Rate (Mbps)
Maximum Range (m)
Channel Capacity

0.5
30
1 to 2 unlicensed channels

6 – 27
Up to 1000
7 licensed channels

Power (Downlink)

Nominally < 40 dBm

Nominally < 33dBm

Power (Uplink)

Nominally < 6 dBm

Nominally < 33dBm

The IEEE1609 family, IEEE802.11p, and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAEJ2735) standards illustrate the WAVE protocol stack Fig.1.3. They define the main
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architectural components of two types of nodes (On Board & Road Side –Units), WAVE
interface, and describe the functionality of WAVE based applications (approved in 2010).
•

IEEE P1609.0 “Draft Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) – Architecture.”

•

IEEE 1609.1 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) – Resource Manager.”

•

IEEE 1609.2 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) – Security Services for Applications and Management messages.”

•

IEEE 1609.3 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) – Networking Services.”

•

IEEE 1609.4 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) – Multi-Channel Operations.”

•

IEEE P1609.11 “Over-the-Air Data Exchange Protocol for Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS).”

•

IEEE 802.11p “Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer
(PHY) specifications – Amendment: Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments.”
The IEEE802.11p standard is an amendment to IEEE802.11 (known as Wi-Fi) for

WAVE applications. It adopts the OFDM PHY on 10MHz channels in 5.9GHz frequency
band. The subcarrier spacing and supported data rate are halved and its symbol and guard
intervals are doubled. Table.1.4 summarizes other OFDM parameters comparison which
makes DSRC more robust and provides low-latency (50ms) in noisy environment.
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Figure.1.3: WAVE ISO/OSI Protocol Stack
Table.1.4: OFDM Wi-Fi Vs. OFDM WAVE Comparison
Parameter

WAVE

Wi-Fi

Spectrum (GHz)

5.9

2.4 and 5

Bandwidth (MHz)
Data Rate (Mbps)
Modulation
Data Subcarriers
Pilot Subcarriers
FFT/IFFT period (µs)

10
3,4.5, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 27
No change
No change
No change
6.4

20
6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54
BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM
48
4
3.2

Subcarrier Spacing

0.15625

0.3125

Guard Interval (µs)
OFDM Symbol Interval
(µs)
Preamble Duration (µs)

1.6

0.8

8

4

32

16

1.3 CHANNELS ALLOCATION, AND ACCESS MODES
The FCC has allocated 75MHz of the spectrum in the 5.9GHz band for DSRC uses.
The DSRC spectrum used in the IEEE802.11p standard is divided into seven 10MHz
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channels with data rates available from 3-27Mbps. One Control Channel (CCH-178) is
designated for data management and transmitting important safety messages, and six other
Service Channels (SCH-172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 184) used for exchanging non-safety data.
Also offered is the option to combine two 10MHz Channels (174, 176) and (180, 182) to
form a 20MHz channels (175 and 181) respectively with data rates from 6-54 Mbps.
Based on the standard regulations, there are four channel access options can be used in the
CCH and SCH interval Fig.1.5. 1) Continuous: where vehicle stays in the CCH to exchange
safety messages when available. 2) Alternating: by accessing the CCH to transmit safety
messages and switches to SCHs to transmit non-safety messages at the beginning of each
channel’s interval. 3) Immediate: this option is specified to allow vehicles to have an
immediate access to SCHs, after receiving an immediate request access, without waiting
for the next SCH interval. 4) Extended: allows vehicles to remain in SCH without any
pause for CCH access. Vehicles shall choose between continuous control channel or
alternating service channel accesses Fig.1.4 depending on which is applicable, unless an
immediate or extended access request received.

Figure 1.4: Alternating Channel Access Option in 802.11p Networks

1.4 DSRC/WAVE DEVICES
There are two classes of devices in a WAVE system: Vehicles equipped with On-
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-Board Units (OBUs) and infrastructures towers-like Road-Side Units (RSUs). OBU and
RSU are equivalent to Mobile Station (MS) and Base Station (BS) in the cellular network.
As a result, the combination of RSUs and OBUs enables mainly two classes of
communications, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Fig.1.6.

Figure.1.5: Receiver Multi-Channel Access Operations defined by IEEE1609 standards
for the MAC Sub-layer extension in DSRC protocol stack (CCH, SCH: Control, Service
channel)

Figure.1.6: Two Communication’s classes among wireless nodes in VANET
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Although other terms may be seen such as Vehicle-to-roadside-unit (V2R) and
Vehicle-to-OBU/RSU (V2X), they are still derived from the main communications V2V
and V2I.
▪ RSUs are stationary towers-like infrastructures deployed on the side of roads. RSUs
are expected to provide coverage (up to 1000m) to disseminate, exchange, and
forward data among nodes. Although RSUs are expected to serve as the main
component to spread safety messages within their range, yet no clear definition
exists regarding their placements on the roads.
▪ OBUs are vehicles equipped with wireless capabilities to exchange data on roads.
These data can be safety related or application-based service data.
Based on the different mobility nature of RSUs and OBUs, several challenges appeared
very quickly concerning communications range, noise, multipath, and Doppler Effect
which will be discussed in the next chapter [2], [11], [15], [19].

1.5 SUMMARY
The new era targets at making cars more intelligent to enhance drivers’ safety and
comfort. Equipping cars with wireless communication capabilities was the first step toward
achieving such a goal. The Intelligent transportation system (ITS), which is a national
program [7], intended to use modern computers and communications to make driving safer,
smarter, faster and more convenient. To achieve these goals, ITS provides automatic toll
collection, traveler information system, intelligent commercial vehicles and intelligent
traffic control systems. The main goal of ITS program is to enhance safety and comfort on
roads by exchanging information among cars.
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CHAPTER 2
CHALLENGES
VANET is expected to enhance safety so it must be extremely robust and able to
cope with various unpredictable environmental conditions (high mobility of nodes,
changing weather, irregular noise, and obstacles). Various conditions pose different impact
on the performance of the wireless communications (the delivery of safety messages).
Failing to receive safety messages may cause accidents, traffic jam, or violations which
cost lives and money. For those reasons many researchers started addressing and analyzing
the impact of different conditions and their effect on the wireless communications. VANET
is expected to operate outdoor in mobile environment, where roads’ and environmental
conditions are constantly changing. Moreover, VANET encompasses highly changeable
mobility (speed and direction). Here we summarize the main natural (unintentional) factors
that make VANET uniquely challenging.

2.1 MOBILITY AND COMMUNICATION
Vehicles speed, direction, and density are constantly changing (matter of seconds).
Vehicles by nature are expected to be mobile at random speed and direction. For instance,
a vehicle may experience a sudden and hard braking due to a construction zone or an
accident in a highway road. This introduces a great challenge especially when dealing with
delivery and latency of safety messages. Hence, regulations recommend and favor
generating UDP network traffic in VANET (including safety messages). Unlike TCP
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(delivery can be verified by Acknowledgment -ACK), ACKs are not applicable in
UDP traffic. In order to enhance safety on roads, the delivery of safety messages must be
ensured when transmitted. The utilization of UDP to generate safety related messages along
with the mobility freedom of vehicles nodes (can leave communication range anytime)
have made VANET a challenging area for researchers and VANET-app developers.

2.2 ROAD CONDITIONS
VANET is expected to operate in outdoor environment where vehicles’ mobility
and the variation in transmission environment (urban, desert, forest and highway) have a
great impact in the quality of the wireless communications. The quality (power) of wireless
signals is easily influenced by obstacles in the space (e.g. trees and buildings), weather
conditions (e.g. snow and rain), and mobility (e.g. speed and direction). Hence, the quality
of communications need to be verified under irregular extreme various conditions such as
vehicles density, surrounding obstacles, geographical characteristics and weather changes,
to evaluate the impact of these conditions on the connectivity and delivery of messages
delivery. It is infeasible and challenging to test all conditions since one can’t change
weather to evaluate the network performance when it is snowing or lightening for example.
Moreover, it is very costly and dangerous to try to replicate real scenarios (e.g. congested
road), which makes it very challenging to conduct experiments and evaluate results.

2.3 ENVIRONMENT (NOISE)
Wireless communications –in general- can be easily interfered with, depending on
the environment operating in (outdoor/indoor). Although VANET uses DSRC in 5.9GHz
spectrum to provide higher noise resilience in outdoor environments, interference can still
happen due to the increase in number of vehicles (engine and communication noise),
13

weather changes, impact of other wireless devices (cellular, Wi-Fi, …etc). In wireless
communications, all undesired collected signals are referred to as white noise regardless
the generating source. Noise degrades the signal quality and strength that carry information
from the transmitter to the receiver. Communications can be disrupted and may be blocked
completely in very noisy environment. The ratio between the desired signal power (Psignal)
to the surrounding noise power (Pnoise) is called Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) represented
as follow:

SNR = Psignal / Pnoise
In outdoor environment, there are more various and random processes occur in
natures that contribute to degrading the signal quality and the network performance. It is
infeasible and challenging to address all variables that can cause interference, especially
the ones caused by natural phenomena (heat, snow, rain, …etc.). Also, the impact on the
signal quality is constantly changing based on the surroundings.

2.4 SUMMARY
VANET uses wireless medium as communications means. Thus, it inherits same
security risks and vulnerabilities of other types of wireless networks. Moreover, deploying
and operating VANET outdoor adds on extra challenges due to natural characteristics of
the environment i.e., highly changeable mobility of nodes, surrounding noise, and road
conditions. Also, various technical factors, including modulations, encoding, frame size,
data rate CP and unused subcarriers, have a great impact on the communications’
performance. The aforementioned challenges have made VANET a hot and challenging
research field especially in terms of security and quality of service. To achieve the ultimate
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goal behind proposing VANET (saving lives), the technology must be extremely robust
and secured to cope with the rapid changes in the environment.
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CHAPTER 3
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE ATTACKS
In the previous chapter, we discussed some of the challenges that undermines
VANET’s ultimate goal of saving lives. We discussed various challenges which impact the
wireless communications (V2V and V2I). The aforementioned challenges are due natural
reasons (weather, obstacles, traffic jam, accidents, etc.), cause unintentional interference,
and their impact can be mitigated. Several researches [21]-[23] have discussed the various
unintentional environmental-phenomena and their effect on performance of the
communications. Additionally, interfering with wireless communications can be
considered not only a challenge but rather a threat when caused intentionally. Radio
frequency interference attacks in VANET are not addressable through conventional
security mechanisms. The high and freedom mobility along with operating outdoor makes
detecting intentional interference a hard research problem. Simply, an attacker can
disregard the protocols defining the medium access and continuously transmit RF signals
to disrupt, block, or interfere with the normal operation of the wireless communications.
This kind of attacks is referred to as jamming attacks. Many jamming attacks models were
proposed as well as algorithms that solves the jamming problem in different wireless
networks. However, applying same the methods to solve intentional jamming in vehicular
networks is not feasible due the characteristics of the environment and communicating
nodes. In this chapter, we give details about the jamming attacks’ operations, behaviors
and their effect on the communication when targeting outdoor-VANETs.
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3.1 OVERVIEW & RELATED WORK
Jamming style attacks target at interfering and disrupting the wireless
communications among legitimate nodes that use wireless channels as communications
medium. Jamming problems have been thoroughly studied by many researchers, military,
companies, and governments. A common knowledge is that a jammer constantly emits RF
signals to fill a wireless channel and block communications among legitimate nodes. Xu et
al. [13] studied the feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless
networks. They introduced different schemes and behaviors that jammers may adopt to
launch powerful and more destructive attacks. They modeled several jamming techniques
in different scenarios using MICA-z wireless motes, and showed how deceptive, random,
and reactive jamming behaviors can greatly impact the performance of the wireless
communications and still remain undetectable when applying conventional algorithms to
detect constant jammers. They also proposed jamming detection and localization
algorithms based on the consistency between the PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio- which
defines the network performance) and the observed Signal Strength (SS) measured by
legitimate wireless nodes. Although their work has been recognized and served as a
benchmark for most of RF- jamming style attacks’ research, applying the same strategy in
VANET won’t solve the jamming problem due to high mobility and irregular
environmental changes. Moreover, jamming effect is not tolerable in VANET since
jamming attacks block the disseminations and delivery of safety messages. Failure to
receive early warning messages may cause accidents and deaths.

17

3.2 JAMMING MODELS AND CHARACTERISTICS IN VANET
VANET is supposed to make roads safer by ensuring proper dissemination and
delivery of early warning and safety messages among vehicles in outdoor environments.
Detecting jamming attacks in this kind of environments is challenging task. The attackers’
freedom of mobility (stationary or roaming) and operation (jamming or sleep) in
unpredictable environment contribute to jammers’ goal (remain hidden when launching
attacks). Detecting jammers becomes even more complicated and challenging depending
on the adopted jamming behavior when launching the attacks. In this section, we discuss
the different jammers mobility and behaviors that may be adopted when launching
jamming attacks in vehicular network environment.

3.2.1 JAMMING MOBILITY
Considering that VANET consists of both stationary (RSUs) and mobile (OBUs)
nodes, a jammer may target at an RSU, an OBU, or randomly roam around. To model these
jamming patterns, we consider the following mobility patterns of a jammer. We focus on
highway roads, and we assume that jammers are interested in remaining undetected.
•

Stationary: A not moving jammer is considered stationary. Such a jammer can be
sitting in a parked car or at road side while launching attacks targeting stationary
RSU or OBU vehicles. Jammers of this type can only distress the communications
effectively where located depending on jamming range. Although jammers of this
type have full control over choosing the attack location, remaining stationary for an
extended period of time increases the chances of getting detected. Also, it is
infeasible to expect attacker to remain stationary in a highway road due to raising
suspicions.
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•

Targeting mobility: This type of mobile jamming intends to target a specific mobile
node (vehicle). Targeting-mobile jammers stay in close range to one car to ensure
the jamming effect throughout the attack period. Depending on the adopted
jamming model, this type of mobility makes detecting jamming hard especially
when combined with reactive jamming behavior (introduced in next subsection).

•

Random mobility. Additionally, jammers may launch attacks while driving in their
cars or motorcycles that keep them mobile without targeting at a chosen target.
They can exhibit random and high mobility with no constrains depending on their
mobility means (cars, motorcycles, drones …etc.)

3.2.2 JAMMING BEHAVIOR
In addition to jammers’ mobility, attacker may choose different jamming behaviors
when launching attacks. Some of these jamming behaviors are more sophisticated than
others based on the probability of remaining undetected.
•

Constant: A constant jammer sends out random radio signals all the time without
following any MAC protocols. The objective of this type of behavior is to prevent
legitimate nodes from accessing communication channels, or corrupt nearby
packets by emitting high power signals (interference) causing higher bit-error-rate
(BER) at the receiver and consequently high packet drop rate. The constant jammer
has full control over when to turn jamming signals on or off.

•

Random: Launching jamming attack that blocks and interferes with communication
consumes a large amount of energy. To reduce energy consumption, a jammer can
alternate between sleep mode for tS and jam for tJ seconds. Adopting this technique
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allows jammers to have more control over energy consumption by altering (tS & tJ)
as needed. Random jamming operation and effect is similar to constant ones, except
that the former has more control over the consumed power by alternating between
jamming and sleeping modes.
•

Reactive: Instead of targeting packets at the sender and prevent their transmission
without considering channel’s conditions, sophisticated active jammers target at the
receiver’s side. They constantly listen to the targeted channel, and once a jammer
senses packets being transmitted, attacker immediately launches jamming attack
and block packets from being received correctly. This particular jamming behavior
is challenging to detect due the hidden nature of jamming (jamming signals overlap
with the packet transmission).

The combination of the aforementioned behaviors and mobility can produce nine types
of jammers. Instead of examining all nine, we focus on reactive jammers with all three
types of mobility patterns. We reason focusing on reactive jamming behavior to their
hidden nature which makes it hard to detect when present. Also, we believe that any method
that can detect reactive jammers can identify constant and random jammers. Already in [1],
authors have studied random and constant jammers in VANET and proposed detection
algorithm, their method rely on the successful reception of at least one beacon, and are not
effective against reactive jammers (indistinguishable from congestion scenarios). Thus,
without loss of generality, we study and validate stationary reactive jammers, targeting
mobility jammers, and random mobility jammers.
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3.3 JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS
When launching a jamming attack, an adversary doesn’t follow any medium access
control protocols. Jammers can disrupt and completely block nearby communications.
Depending on the jammer’s position when launching the attack, the whole network in that
area is affected. Therefore, jamming impact need to be investigated further, especially its
impact on the operation of an outdoor and highly mobile environment. Xu et al. studied the
feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks [13]. They
evaluated jamming impact and effectiveness in their work using Berkeley motes. Although
their algorithm showed promising results, it is infeasible to apply their technique in
VANET due to unique characteristics of the network (encompass high mobility and volatile
topology). Thus, we present the three metrics (PDR, PSR, SS) that are widely used to
evaluate the performance of the network. These metrics are closely related to the network
performance and are used to identify abnormalities that any wireless network may
encounter.
•

Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). The ratio of successful delivered packets to destination
compared to number of packets that have been sent out by sender. In vehicle network,
the density of vehicles is highly changeable and dependent on road conditions and the
time of day. For instance, during rush hours or holidays, roads experience more traffic
(congestion) which corresponds to observing lower PDR. Also, if a jammer exists,
packets will suffer from intentional interference causing a significant drop in the PDR.
Consequently, distinguishing between low PDR caused by congestion or jamming
attack is impossible by relying on PDR as a single metric.
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•

Packet Send Ratio (PSR). The ratio of packets that are successfully sent out by a
legitimate source compared to the number of packets it intends to send out in the MAC
layer. In congested roads, vehicles tend to travel at much lower speed which entitles
longer communication period between nodes. Consequently, channel observes more
RTS/CTS (Request/Clear -to send) requests leading to higher drop in PSR.
Additionally, when jammer presents, the noise introduced by jammer may hold the
channel status as busy, which leads to an increase in node’s back-off timer and delay
to receive CTS response. Regardless whether road is congested or jammed, more
packets will be buffered and discarded upon the arrival of new packets or when they
timed-out causing low observed PSR. Therefore, it is inadequate to rely on PSR alone
to identify congested or jammed channel especially in the presence of reactive jammer
who’s targeting at packets after being sent out.

•

Signal Strength (SS). Is a powerful tool measured at receiver that defines the signal
quality of the radio frequency signals that carry data from source to destination. Since
wireless nodes can sample SS during any period of time (depends on the employed
protocol), many researchers have been utilizing SS to detect jamming attacks in
different wireless networks. In VANET, vehicles have the freedom to enter and exit
communications’ range at random speed. As a result, observing high SS may
correspond to high vehicles intensity (congestion), or jamming attack. Also, in case of
jammers adopting reactive behavior (stay hidden until packets being transmitted), a
lower SS maybe observed when measured during the transmission period. Therefore,
one can’t rely on SS as a standalone metric to distinguish between jamming and
congestion scenarios.
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To summarize, we introduced three different mobility patterns and three jamming
techniques that jammer may adopt when launching attacks. We presented three network
metrics that have been used to evaluate the performance of any wireless networks. We also
discussed the deficiency to rely on these metrics (PDR, PSR, and SS) individually to detect
and distinguish between jamming attack scenarios and congested road ones.
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CHAPTER 4
DETECTING JAMMING ATTAKS IN 802.11p NETWORKS
The development of wireless Vehicle Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) aimed to
enhance road’s safety and provide comfortable driving environment. This goal can be
achieved by ensuring proper dissemination and reception of early warning and
infotainment messages. Intentional jamming attack targets at interfering with the normal
operation of the network by disrupting wireless communications. Since VANET uses
wireless medium as communication mean in outdoor environment (highly changeable road
conditions, atmospheric phenomena, and nodes behaviors), estimating the network
performance is a challenging task. Also, applying conventional methods to monitor,
analyze and secure the network is infeasible. The combination of various road conditions
and random mobility of nodes (traveling speed and directions) makes detecting jamming
attacks a unique problem. Failure to detect jammers poses a threat to people lives and
economy. Thus, in order to evaluate network performance accurately, and achieve a
reliable detection of jammers, first we identify the impact of vehicles density on the
performance of the network in term of signal strength and packet delivery. Then, we study
jamming effectiveness when adopting different mobility patterns (stationary, random, or
targeting) and behaviors (constant, random, and reactive). We focus on analyzing jamming
impact when adopting reactive behavior, and different mobility patterns. Finally, we
propose a two-phase algorithm to detect the presence of jammers in outdoor mobile
environment. We evaluate our proposed algorithm in various highway scenarios using
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simulation. It is worth mentioning that our approach shows promising results to
detect different types of jammers accurately in IEEE802.11p network.

4.1 ROAD CONDITIONS ANALYSIS
Road conditions are unpredictable by nature. Many factors impact the traffic on road
including but not limited to (vehicles density, obstacles, weather conditions, construction
zones, traffic lights, and speed limit). Most of these factors tend to be the same when
analyzing a specific road for a period of time (hours). The density of vehicles on a road
stands to be the only variable that inclusive rapid change over short period of time (matter
of seconds or minutes). For instance, road could pack up with cars simply because it is
rush-hour, work zone or due to accidents. Regardless the cause, the increase in number of
vehicles in a certain road suggests more communication within that area. Hence, network
experiences higher throughput in that area. Once reaching certain threshold (close to reach
the maximum network bandwidth), all communications will be dropped due to network
congestion. As a result, lower PDR and higher Packet lost rate (PLR) are observed.
Conducting a real-world experiment is very costly, dangerous, and time consuming.
Therefore, we consider using NCTUns 6.0 to evaluate the impact of vehicles’ density on
the performance of the network. It is reasonable to assume that using NCTUns as an
evaluation tool is sufficient based on a comparison study [24]-[25]. We also studied the
development of NCTUns 6.0 and how various variables are modeled based on the approved
802.11p standards to verify the accuracy of our results Appendix A. So, in order to evaluate
the performance of the network, we constructed a highway road that consists of two lanes
(common in US), and placed RSU at the edge of the road (to ensure maximum link-time
between nodes). Each simulation case ran for period of time (the time needed by a car to
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enter the RSU range until exiting). We define nodes maximum transmission power of
(28.8dBM) and broadcasting dissemination rate at 10 Basic Safety Messages per second
(BSM/s). Each BSM was generated as UDP traffic and size of (200-500 bytes) according
to 802.11p standards [12].
We start running first case with 1 vehicle which corresponds to vehicle traveling on
idle interstate (commonly not busy) or at off-peak traffic time (e.g. after mid-night). It is
worth mentioning that vehicle nodes were defined with collision avoidance behavior rules
where they can freely accelerate, decelerate, and switch lanes based on road conditions.
We incremented the number of vehicles (to simulate road traffic under different conditions)
and observed the impact of various vehicles density on traveling speed, communication
time, and network performance (in term of PDR, PSR, and SS). Results in Fig.4.1.A shows
that when vehicle density reaches %52 -around 60 cars/lane- of the roads capacity
[calculated by dividing road length per lane within RSU range (1000m) over the length of
average size vehicle (6m)], a noticeable drop in PDR, and PSR occur due to slower
traveling speed causing longer communications time and more data exchange among
nodes. We also noticed a slight increase in the measured SS that can be justified as more
noise (communication, thermal, etc.) generated due to high vehicle density. Additionally,
when the drop in the PDR reaches more than %45, the measured SS tend to remain almost
the same. The key observation is the relation between vehicles density, velocity, and flow
intensity. Thus, we classify road conditions based on the nodes’ density as follow:
•

Normal Period. Represents low density of vehicles traveling at, or close to, the
posted speed limit on that road. During this period, vehicles experience reliable
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communication links within RSU range until exiting. This period tends to be
insignificance to the attacker interest due to the low number of cars.
•

Rush-Hour Period. Vehicles are forced to travel at much lower speed when vehicle
density exceeds a certain threshold. Nodes tend to observe much lower PDR and
PSR which correspond to higher lost packet rate than in normal period Fig.4.1.
Therefore, ensuring reliable delivery of safety messages is essential during this
period. Failure to receive sensitive data may result drivers to fail to slow, reroute,
or stop in timely manner to avoid crashes.

•

Incident Period. When number of vehicles is high and close to the capacity of the
road, vehicles experience what’s called a traffic jam (hours of non-moving or stopand-go traffic). This tends to be the most favorable and effective period for jammers
to launch their attack and remain undetected. The significance of this period is the
tight relation between vehicles density and the probability of incidents to occur
(high density corresponds to high probability of accident to occur).

4.2 DETECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a two-phase algorithm: (i) Initialization and (ii) Detection,
to detect jammers based on the consistency between SS and Packet Delivery/Send Ratio
(PDSR). Since road conditions vary from road to another, we consider vehicles density on
road to serve as dynamic variable that correspond to the various conditions on roads.
•

Initialization Phase –Ip. This phase may be conducted during a guaranteed time
of non-interfered network operation (easily achieved by monitoring SS distribution
over initialization time period (Tipt), or equipping RSU with SS meter to filter out
any amplified or unwanted measurements). Also, Initialization Phase (Ip) must be
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conducted when vehicles’ density is relatively high, i.e. rush-hour, which easy to
find depending on the road that RSU being deployed at. During this phase, RSU
will calculate and collect (PDSR, SS, PLR) Packet-delivery/send-ratio, signal
strength and packet lost rate in a table for Tipt. Once the initialization period timer
Tipt expires, RSU will find upper bound (SS) value that would have produced a
particular PDSR in non-jammed-rush-hour scenario [PDSRj, Max(SSj)]. After
forming the table, RSU will assign two threshold values γPDSR and γPLR, the
maximum PDSRj and the minimum PLRj respectively, calculated during (Tipt).
Then a simple regression will be conducted to build a relation between (PDSR, SS)
values for all (PDSRx) that have not been observed and are less than the set
threshold (γPDSR). Finally, each RSU node will calculate and set periodic monitoring
timer (Twind) by calculating the needed time by a car to enter and exit that RSU
range denoted [TCap= road length within RSU range(LoR) over the posted speed
limit on road(SLoR) ]. Upon the completion of this phase, each RSU will have a
table contains an upper bound SS value to produce a particular PDSR, a periodic
monitor window (Twind), and two thresholds (γPDSR, γPLR) Table 4.1. It is worth
mentioning, the collected data including thresholds will vary from one RSU to
another depending on the roads that been deployed on.
•

Detection Phase with consistency check. RSU will monitor (PDSR, SS) and
calculate PLR every time window (WPLR). When the observed PDSR and PLR
exceed γPDSR and γPLR set during Ip, a consistency check is performed
C_Check(Max(PDSR), SS) to check whether the low observed PDSR is consistent
with the measured SS. The C_Check function, Table 4.3, takes an input

28

(Max(PDSR), SS) as pair and check whether the measured SS is consistent with the
observed PDSR by checking the (PDSR Ip, SSIp) table generated during the
initialization period. The Boolean C_Check return decides whether the low
observed PDSR is due jamming attack, or a typical congested road. The detector
will also return “normal state” when Twind runs out with no abnormalities Table 4.2.
Table.4.1: Jamming Detection Algorithm [Initialization Phase]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Algorithm 1: [Initialization phase]
Input: Tip, LoR,SLoR
Output: (PDSRj, SSj), (PDSRx, SSx), γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR
for (j=1, j<= Tip, j++) do
|
Sum = 0
|
for (i = j-1 → i=j) do
|
|
Data[i] = (PDRi, PSRi, SSi, PLRi)
|
|
Sum = Sum++
|
end
|
PDSRj = (∑ PDRi + ∑PSRi) / 2Sum
|
SSj = {SSi, SSi+1, SSi+2, …}
|
PLRj = Average (PLRi)
|
Data[j] = (PDSRj, SSj, PLRj)
end
TCap = LoR/ SLoR, WPLR, T(PLRj), Twind = TCap/WPLR
γPDSR = Max(PDSRj | PDSRj ϵ Data[j])
γPLR = Min(PLRj | PLRj ϵ Data[j])
foreach PDSRj ϵ Data[j]
|
Find upper bound MAX(SSi) ϵ SSj that would
|
produce (PDSRj)
end
foreach PDSRx ∉Data[j], and PDSRx < γPDSR do
|
Conduct simple regression to build a relation
|
between (PDSRx, SSx)
|
Data[x] = (PDSRx, SSx)
end
return (γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR, Data[j], Data[x])
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Table.4.2: Jamming Detection Algorithm [Detection Phase]
Algorithm 2: [Detection phase]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Input: γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR
Output: State
Initialize: Counter = 0, State = NORMAL
While (Counter < Size[Twind]) do
|
Counter++
|
for each WPLR do
|
|
Calculate ( PDSRJ, SSj, PLRj)
|
|
if (PLRj > γPLR) && (PDSRj < γPDSR) then
|
|
| if C_Check(MaxPDSRj, SSj) == True then
|
|
|
| Counter = 0
|
|
|
| State = (CONGESTED)
|
|
| else
|
|
|
| Counter = 0
|
|
|
| State = (JAMMED)
|
|
| end
|
| end
|
| return (State)
|
| State = (NORMAL)
|
end
end
return (State)

4.3 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATIONS
In order to evaluate our algorithm, we simulate a two-lane highway road of 1000 meter
length (maximum RSU range) with different vehicle density (1-100 OBUs). We define
same parameters mentioned in section4.1. [refer to Appendix B for details] We considered
free space and shadowing propagation model which is more appropriate when simulating
outdoor environment. Observations from simulators’ results are summarized as follow.
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•

In Non-Attacker cases, we observed a significant drop in network performance
when vehicles occupied more than %52 of the maximum road capacity. Thus, we
assign this value (52%) as vehicle density threshold (approx. 60 cars) that
Table.4.3: Jamming Detection Algorithm [Consistency Check]
Algorithm 3: Consistency_Check()

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
•

Input: γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR
Output: State
Initialize: Counter = 0, State = NORMAL
While (Counter < Size[Twind]) do
|
Counter++
|
for each WPLR do
|
|
Calculate ( PDSRJ, SSj, PLRj)
|
|
if (PLRj > γPLR) && (PDSRj < γPDSR) then
|
|
| if C_Check(MaxPDSRj, SSj) == True then
|
|
|
| Counter = 0
|
|
|
| State = (CONGESTED)
|
|
| else
|
|
|
| Counter = 0
|
|
|
| State = (JAMMED)
|
|
| end
|
| end
|
| return (State)
|
| State = (NORMAL)
|
end
end
return (State)

corresponds to the road’s conditions during rush hour (congested road) to run the
Initialization phase -Ip. After running experiments and collecting data, we plotted
our results shown in Fig.4.1.B with trend-line corresponding to threshold calculated
during Ip.

•

For Attacker scenarios, we implemented reactive jammer with multi-mobility
capabilities (stationary, random, and targeting) and defined the mobility to follow
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the posted speed limit on road when possible (i.e. clear lane). Also, we defined
fixed jamming power of 44dbm (such a device can be obtained for less than $200).
Results Figur.4.1.C shows a strong tie between jammers’ impact (depending on its
location) on the measured SS, and the correspondent packet lost rate. In low vehicle
density, our algorithm detected jammers when its location is close enough to affect the
transmission/delivery of packets. Also, in targeting mobility jamming case, some packets
still got delivered correctly depending on the targeted node location and RSU.
Additionally, when vehicle density reaches the congestion threshold, RSU detected jammer
efficiently once nodes failed to receive sufficient communications based on vehicle density
on road. Looking at Fig.4.1, one can clearly see the relation between the observed SS and
PDSR in the present and absence of jammers.

4.4 CONCLUSIONS
VANET, which is based on inserting wireless access in vehicle environments, are
becoming reality and being deployed to enhance safety and provide a variety of services.
Although VANET’s main goal is to enhance safety and comfort on roads, intentional
jamming aims to undermine such a goal by interfering with the wireless communications.
Therefore, understanding the nature of jamming attacks in vehicle environment is critical
to ensure the proper operation of the wireless network. This paper has sought to focus on
investigating jamming mobility and behaviors in highway roads. We have presented three
different jamming behaviors and three mobility patterns that jammer can adopt when
launching attacks. We then studied reactive jamming impact, adopting various mobility
patterns (stationary, random, or targeting), in different road conditions. We showed
jamming effect on PDSR and SS causing failure to receive safety messages. We then
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proposed a solution to detect jammers based on road conditions in which RSUs are
deployed at. Our algorithm proved its effectiveness by achieving high detection accuracy
in different vehicle density scenarios.
4.5 SUMMARY
The development of wireless VANET aimed to enhance road's safety and provide
comfortable driving environment. This goal can be achieved by ensuring proper
dissemination and reception of early warning and infotainment messages. Intentional
jamming attack targets at interfering with the normal operation of the network by disrupting
wireless communications. Since VANET uses wireless medium as communication mean
and performs in outdoor environment (highly changeable road conditions, atmospheric
phenomena, and nodes behaviors), estimating the network performance is a challenging
task. Due to the nature of VANET, encompasses high mobility of vehicles and volatile
topology, applying conventional methods to monitor, analyze and secure the network is
infeasible. Thus, we provide this work which focuses jamming mobility and behaviors in
IEEE802.11p networks. We focus on analyzing jamming impact, adopting reactive
behaviors and different mobility patterns. The combination of various road conditions and
random mobility of nodes (traveling speed and directions) makes detecting jamming
attacks a challenging task. Thus, to achieve reliable detection, first we identified the impact
of vehicles density on the network performance. Then, we studied jamming effectiveness
when adopting different mobility patterns (stationary, random, or targeting) and behaviors
(constant, random, and reactive). Our three main contributions are, i) Presenting rich
contents and details regarding the new technology DSRC and the 802.11p standards, ii)
Provide a full understanding of jamming attacks, threats, and capabilities especially when

33

dealing with outdoor wireless networks, and iii) Detecting intentional interference attacks
targeting at disrupting the normal operation of IEEE802.11p networks
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Figure.4.1: Result PDSR and SS A) Initialization Phase of 60 cars. B) Normal scenario 1-80 cars. And C) Attacker Scenario 1-80 cars

CHAPTER 5
JAMMING DETECTION – SIMULATION & ANALYSIS
Problem Description & contributions:
1- DSRC uses CCH and SCH. We focus on studying the CCH (Ch178).
2- Study the feasibility to launch jamming attack by transmitting at high fixed power
(Constantly or reactively) causing failure to receive packets at the receiver side and
consequently a drop in PDR.
3- Proposing a detection algorithm to detect jammers targeting DSRC (dedicated short
range communication) in a vehicle network.
WAVE Standards:
1

Nodes: Cars (OBU) + Infrastructure (RSU) introducing V2V and V2X
communications with 28.8dBm Max. output power.

2

Channels: 1 Control Channel (Ch 178) with 10 MHz bandwidth and data rate
6Mbps, and 6 Service channels with 10 MHz bandwidth (20Mhz optional) and data
rate (3-27Mbps)

3

Channel Access: Control Channel, Service channel, and Guard (5 MHz) – intervals
(CCHI, SCHI, GI) was introduced where CCHI and SCHI are roughly = 50µs each,
and GI = 1.6 µs (microsecond) as recommended by 1609.4 standards.
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4

Messages: Nodes should be able to exchange safety messages on the control
channel depending on the incident. The Society of automotive engineers (SAE)DSRC Tech. Committee has defined in the standards (SAE-J2735) dissemination
messages rate at 10 messages/s. They also defined the safety messages size to be
(200-500) byte including authentication overhead.

Measurements:
1- BSM: Basic safety messages that is periodically broadcasted to surrounding
vehicles.
2- Message Rate: We use the suggested rate of 10 messages per second to broadcast
event (safety Msg.)
3- Packet Size: max. reasonable packet size is used (500 byte) for each BSM.
4- PDR: We use packet delivery ratio at the receiver in this analysis. (delivered
packets over sent packets)
5- PSR: We use packet sent ratio at sender in this analysis. (sent packets over intended
to send)
6- PDSR: This is a new proposed measurement that we will use to evaluate the
network behavior. It is intuitive that when Constant jammer exists both PSR and
PDR will drop which correspond to low PDSR. On the other hand Reactive jammer
will only impact the PDR and hence it is a promising measurement to use to
distinguish between different types of jammers.
7- RSSI: We obtain RSSI at the receiver when receiving BSM.
8- SNR: We obtain the signal-to-noise ratio measured at the receiver upon receiving
BSM.
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9- BER: Bit error rate is obtained at the receiver after decoding the received signals.
10- Throughput: throughput will be used to measure data-flow in channel at all time in
Kbps.
Cases: In our work we study 2 main cases, normal and attacker. There are many sub-cases
that correspond to the real-life scenarios. We categorize our study cases and sub-cases as
follow:
1- Normal cases:
a. Where vehicle density within 1 RSU range is low enough to produce high
𝑷𝑺𝑹

PDSR (

𝟐

+

𝑷𝑫𝑹
𝟐

).

b. Where vehicle density is high due to congestion and the PDSR will be
investigated based on the maximum road’s capacity of vehicles depending
on the number of lanes.
Notes: In these cases, we will simulate several scenarios to mimic (interstate
and urban) scenarios. Also, nodes density will be tested to find the capacity
threshold to ensure the delivery of BSM.
2- Attacker cases:
a. Attacker is active while vehicle density within 1 RSU range is low.
b. Attacker is active while vehicle density is high due to congestion (incident).
Notes: 2 types of attackers will be implemented (constant and reactive) with
different mobility behaviors (stationary and mobile).
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Performance Analysis (Non Attacker-Highway) scenario: We perform intensive
simulations with different node’s density to find the node’s density threshold that cause
high packets drop rate.
Road capacity: in order to build our cases realistically we need to investigate the maximum
number of vehicles that can occupy 1 lane in a road. It is worth to mention that we don’t
consider large vehicles (Trailers, Busses, and semi-trucks), instead we assume that all
vehicles are regular size cars. The validity of our assumption is based on the more vehicles
occupying roads, the more likely to have congestions. In order to estimate the maximum
number of vehicles per lane, we assume that RSU have the maximum communication range
up to (1000m) in diameter. Depending on the distance between the RSU and the road we
can measure the maximum communication range by drawing a circle around the RSU.
Let’s assume that RSU can communicate with nodes up to 1000 meter. Therefore the radius
of the RSU communication range is 500 denoted (r). If the angle (n) formed by RSU and
road, then the segment area of road that within RSU communication range can be
calculated as:
1 lane Road Segment Area within RSU range = (r2\2) [n (π/180) – sin (n)]
Where:
n

is the central angle in DEGREES

r

radius of the circle of which the segment is a part.

π

is Pi, approximately 3.142

sin is the trigonometry Sine function
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Hence, we can calculate maximum node capacity by dividing the calculated segment over
vehicle node dimension. (Average 4meter length x 2 meter width –Full size cars) we add
4 meters in length to compensate for space required between cars in front and behind (since
stacking cars bumper to bumper is not feasible). Hence an average dimension for cars
(excluding trucks and irregular car sizes) should occupy an area of 12 m2. Therefore, the
maximum road capacity of vehicles within RSU range will be:
Max Capacity = (r2\2) [ n(π/180)-sin n] / [(L+S)*W]

L: vehicle length.
S: space between nodes.
W: cars width.

We assume that RSU is sitting at the edge of the road for simplicity, then the value of n
(the angle between RSU and the edge of the road on both sides of that RSU is 180o. Hence
the maximum number of vehicles that can occupy one lane within an RSU range of
(1000m) will be:
= approximately 110 regular size vehicles.
Alternatively, we use a simpler technique that is based on the road length (1000m) and
divide that over the average length of vehicles (6 m). We also add 4 m to the vehicle’s
length to compensate for the safe distance behind and in-front of vehicles as follow:
Road to vehicles capacity = 1000 / [ 6+4]
We use the value (100 as the upper bound) to correspond to the maximum road’s capacity
of vehicles. when evaluating the network behavior in the simulator platform.
Propagation model: We use free space and shadowing propagation model since in a real
world RSU may be deployed in an area where there exist LoS between RSU and vehicles.
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Fading model: 2 fading models were investigated (raician and rayligh). Due to the
possibility of LoS existence between nodes we use Raician model in our simulations since
Rician fading occurs when one of the paths, typically a LoS, is much stronger than the
others.
Simulation time: Due to the numerous numbers of cases and scenarios that we will
simulate, we need to carefully choose simulation time that will be large enough to collect
necessary data and short enough to avoid unnecessary processing and resources usage.
Hence, we investigate the simulation time that we need for that matter. Let’s assume cars
travelling in an interstate (speed [45-80mph]). Hence in order to capture communications
data between nodes and RSU (when entering, driving, and exiting RSU communication
range), we define our simulation time to be the time that is needed for high speed vehicles
to enter and exit RSU communication range. Hence the simulation time can be calculated
as follow:
Simulation time = RSU max communication range / vehicles maximum speed
= 1000m / 80Mph = 1000m / 35 mps = 28.5 seconds
Therefore, we use 30 seconds to be our simulation time to compensate for vehicles entering
and exiting RSU communication range, and save computer resources during simulations.
Link availability time: Based on current study, link availability in mobile network depends
entirely (in general) on the distance between sender and receiver. So we consider the link
availability between nodes based on the distance between node and RSU. Hence we can
define the link availability between RSU and any vehicle node to be AVAILABLE_Link
for time (t in seconds) where t is the time from car node enter RSU communication range
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until existing RSU range (which is a function of car speed and the distance between RSU
and car node).
Simulation Parameters:
The table below summarizes our general simulation parameters:
Table 5.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
Simulator
Simulation Time
Node Type
Topology
Minimum number of
vehicles
Maximum Number of
vehicles
Mobile node speed
Acceleration, Deceleration
Number of lanes (bidirection)
Lane width
Channel Type
Channel Number
Channel Frequency
Channel spacing
(bandwidth)
Channel Interval
Propagation

Value
NCTUns
30 seconds
RSU & OBU
Interstate & Urban
1

Notes
Release 6.0
Per simulation case
-------------

110

Per lane

(45-80) or (20-50) Mph
Freely
2

Interstate vs. Urban
Car nodes
1lane each direction

4m
Control Channel
178
5.890 GHz
10 Mhz

US regulation
--------5.885-5.895 Ghz
-------------

Fading Model
Data Type
BSM (Packet) size
Communication type
RSU-BSM rate
Car-BSM rate
Data rate (CCH)

50 ms
Free space and
shadowing
Rician
BSM
500 byte
Broadcast
10 messages per second
10 messages per second
6 Mbps

Max. Transmission power
Receiver sensitivity
Transport layer protocol

28.8 dbm
-82
UDP
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----Basic Safety Message
1 BSM per packet
Bi-directional (V2X)
US Standards
Correspond to incident
Standards Recommendation
(CCH)
Standards
----Standards Recommendation

Topology (Interstate):

Figure 5.1: Highway Topology
Normal-Case1 (1 RSU + 1 Car)
In this case, we simulate 1 Car and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 byte/BSM
using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where car speed is between 45-80
Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second where each
message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 30 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted. I.e. out of the 300 BSM that was sent by RSU, car moving
at high speed was able to receive 260 messages during driving in that RSU range.

Figure 5.2: 1 OBU and 1 RSU Highway Scenario
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Normal-Case 2 (1 RSU + 10 Cars):
In this case, we simulate 10 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 144 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU.
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 156 messages during driving in that
RSU range. We also note that Cars will still receive all the messages that RSU transmitted
even though the presence of 9 more vehicles travelling on the same route resulted on higher
packets loss.

Figure 5.3: 10 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario
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Normal-Case 3 (1 RSU + 20 Cars):
In this case, we simulate 20 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 155 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU.
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 145 messages during driving in that
RSU range. We also note that Cars were still able to receive more than 1BSM/sec RSU
transmitted even though the presence of 19 more vehicles travelling on the same route
resulted on higher packets loss.

Figure 5.4: 20 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario
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Normal-Case 4 (1 RSU + 40 Cars):
In this case, we simulate 40 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 183 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU.
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 117 messages during driving in that
RSU range. We also note that Cars (overall) were still able to receive more than
1BSM/second that RSU transmitted even though the presence of 39 more vehicles
travelling on the same route resulted on higher packets loss.

Figure 5.5: 40 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario
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Normal-Case 5 (1 RSU + 60 Cars):
In this case, we simulate 60 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 197 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU.
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 103 messages during driving in that
RSU range. We also note that Cars still were able to receive all the messages that RSU
transmitted even though the presence of 59 more vehicles travelling on the same route
resulted on higher packets loss.

Figure 5.6: 60 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario
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Normal-Case 6 (1 RSU + 80 Cars):
In this case, we simulate 80 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 215 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU.
Conclusion: In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent
by RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 85 messages during driving in that
RSU range. We also note that Cars still were able to receive all the messages (at least 1
BSM/s) that RSU transmitted even though the presence of 79 more vehicles travelling on
the same route resulted on higher packets loss.
Normal-Case 7 (1 RSU + 100 Cars):
In this case, we simulate 100 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message.
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 247 packets out
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU.
Conclusion: In other words, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent
by RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 53 messages during driving in that
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RSU range (only 24 unique BSMs were received). We also note that when nodes density
reaches 100 nodes within 1 RSU range, the channel bandwidth is unable to sustain nodes
congestions and hence safety messages will be lost.

Figure 5.7: 100 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario
Further Notes:
We noticed that most of packets got lost due to the impact of node’s density on
RSU communication (hearing) range. In other words, the higher cars density within RSU
range, the higher attenuation occurs in nodes hearing range within that area due to the
increase in the noise power. Also, in an area where nodes density is high, the probability
of packets to collide is high which explain the drastic drop in packet delivery ratio. We
notice that there exist a tight relationship between RSU’s and cars communication range,
and vehicles density within that area at time t. In other words, there is a tradeoff between
the number of vehicles in any section of the road and the communication range of all nodes
existed in that area. So, we relate the increase of packet loss to the increase of cars density
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within an RSU range which impact communication range and the collision probability
between packets.
We also noticed that in highway scenarios when nodes density increases the cars
speed decreases and hence the link-availability-duration increase because cars will spend
longer time within the RSU range. Although this should increase the probability for
vehicles to receive messages correctly however, depending on the number of vehicles that
may exist during congestion, communication overhead may occur consequently causing
attenuation to communication range between nodes.
RSU Deployment Location:
In our analysis we discussed how nodes density affects the number of dropped
packets. Hence, we propose placing RSU in away to have a maximum node’s density of
no more than 90 nodes per lane (to ensure the delivery of at least 1 BSM/s).
Recall the formula which calculates the maximum number of vehicles that can
occupy 1 lane.
Max Capacity\ 1 lane = (r2\2) [ n(π/180)-sin n] / [(L+S)*W]
Then we can use it to find the best location to deploy RSUs based on their distance from
road as follow:
90 = 125000 [ n(π)/180) – Sin n] / [L+S) * W
90 = 500 [ n (π) / 180 – Sin n] / 12
n (π) – Sin n = approx. 400 meter between RSUs when deploy
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Hence, RSU (with high vehicles density within its communication range) can
communicate up to approximately 400* 2 = 800 meter if it was sitting at the edge of the
road.
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Figure 5.12: Sample Data after cleaning

CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF LONG-RANGE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
CAPABILITIES AMONG MULTIPLE AUTONOMOUS SURFACE VEHICLES (ASVS)
The rapid advancement in sensor modalities enabled a fleet of robots to carry their
missions autonomously and efficiently and by maintaining reliable communications among
them and base-stations [58]. Although robots nowadays are more sophisticated in term of
exploring capability (drive, fly, and dive autonomously) based on sensory data, monitoring
exploring robots during A mission is crucial to minimize potential loss (fatality or
financially). Hence, it is essential to provide low latency, reliable, and robust
communication channels to ensure a continuous and effective monitoring of autonomous
robots during missions. The desirable communication range along with the number of
communicating nodes, are the key factors that define the frequency band (VHF, UHF, SHF,
etc.) To be used in the radio spectrum for communications. Nevertheless, several other
factors contribute to degrading the quality of communications, such as, but not limited to,
environmental noise and weather outdoor, and walls and obstacles indoor.
6.1 INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE, AND MOTIVATIONS.
Several works investigated the wireless communications among a fleet of autonomous
vehicles and provided a rich analysis in different communication bands of the rf spectrum.
Hayat et al. [59] demonstrated in their work the feasibility of maintaining links between
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multiple drones and base station in single/multi-hop manner. Although their work showed
promising results by adopting the wi-fi band for communications (802.11N, ac),
communicating in wi-fi band is limited in range up to a couple of hundred meters [60].
Also, Morgenthaler et al. Developed the UAVNET prototype that forms a flying wireless
mesh network [61]. Results showed 6.3 times higher throughput in flying wireless mesh
nodes

than

a

ground-based

network

approach.

Figure. 6.1: Jetyaks equipped with RFD900+ modems
This chapter presents a performance evaluation that can be used as a guide to
understand the capability and reliability of long range communications. Such a study can
then be used to better design a network for a team of multiple robots in marine
environments, where long range distance communication is necessary. We present the
different configurations that can be setup and their impacts on communications in a mobile
environment. We focus on communicating in the ism band (900MHz) when experimenting
indoor and outdoor. We use cheap, off the Shelf radio frequency (rf) modems – open source
RFD900+ (widely used for peer-to-peer telemetry communications). Several indoor and
outdoor experiments show the quality of the communications in terms of latency, range,
and the impact on data rate and RSSI value (received signal strength indicator). It is worth
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mentioning that our motive behind adopting 900 MHz is the low-cost/weight of the
hardware, and the potential to cover longer ranges with better penetration through obstacles
than higher frequencies. Due to limited space when running indoor experiments, we
assume stationary robots. More significantly, outdoor experiments were conducted by
mounting rfd900+ hardware on a fleet of autonomous surface vehicles (ASV) masts; see
fig.6.1. We present multiple setup scenarios and discussions regarding the radio
configuration and results. We start by evaluating the communication between one base
station and one mobile robot. Results show that we can maintain robust link between the
Jetyaks and bs (base-station). We then add another bs to simulate multiple BSs monitoring
the same Jetyak. Several other key-experiments were performed with multiple Jetyaks
communicating with multiple BSs forming a mesh-like network. Observations and analysis
are discussed related to evaluating communication links between multiple Jetyaks and BSs.
Fig. 6.2 shows a deployment in the Congaree river in South Carolina with four Jetyaks,
where the communication quality was experimentally evaluated fig. 6.3. The main
contribution is to give an insight of the different setups that can be easily adopted when
monitoring autonomous vehicles over a long range (over 10 miles) using basic hardware
and how to optimize and tune parameters to achieve higher throughput and range. Future
work will consider the construction of a communication map [62] in order to control the
ASVs facilitating a communication link to the ground control station while Exploring areas
larger than the communication ranges [63].
6.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND CASE-STUDIES
We conducted multiple experiments indoors and outdoors using RFD900+ radio
modem fig 6.4 to evaluate the quality of communications of 900MHz band. We also ran
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multiple scenarios for each experiment where two nodes were communicating with each
other as a base station and remote node. We then added another remote node to analyze the
impact on the quality of communications. All indoor experiments were run in the Horizon
II building were base station was installed in one room in the first floor (#1215) and remote
node in another room (#1205). The distance between the two rooms were at least 150 ft.
with, multiple walls exist in between (more than 8 walls) to test the penetration strength of
the signal. Table 6.1 shows the various parameters that can be configured when setting up
nodes for communications. On the other hand, all outdoor experiments were conducted on
either Lake Murray or the Congaree river where Jetyaks were either controlled by a
transmitter or an actual personnel riding in them. Fig 5.5 shows the preparation for one of
the outdoor experiment on the Congaree River.

Figure 6.2: GPS traces of four ASVs during deployment at the Congaree River
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Figure 6.3: RSSI and Noise Vs. Time for local and remote nodes

Figure 6.4: RFD900+ Radio Modem as BS
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Table 6.1: RFD900+ configurable parameters and their meaning
Parameter

Description

Default

Max

Min

Format

EEPROM Version

---

---

---

Serial Speed

In one byte form

57

115

2

Air Speed

Data rate in one byte

64

250

2

Net ID

Network ID

25

499

0

Tx Power

In dBm

20

30

0

ECC

Error Correcting Code

0

1

0

Mavlink

Mavlink Framing & Reporting

0

1

0

Op Resend

Opportunic Resend

0

1

0

Min Freq

In KHz

915,000

927,000

902,000

Max Freq

In KHz

9228,000

928,000

903,000

Num Channel

Frequency hopping channels

20

50

5

Duty Cycle

Percentage of time to transmit

100

100

10

LBT Rssi

Listen before talk

0

1

0

Manchester

Manchester encoding

0

1

0

RTS CTS

Ready / Clear to send

0

1

0

Node ID

Unique ID for each node

2

29

0

Node Dest

Remote ID to communicate with

65535

29

0

Sync Any

Broadcast feature

0

1

0

Node Count

Total number of nodes

2

30

2

6.3 EVALUATION AND RESULTS
We focus on showing results for point-to-point and multipoint communications in
outdoor experiments since our motive behind this work is to analyze the communications
among a fleet of ASVs.
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Figure 6.5: Preparation and setting up for outdoor Experiments
6.3.1 Point-to-Point
We were able to achieve robust and reliable communications between the two
Jetyaks with data rate up to 250 kps with no issues. Below we show the optimal
configuration that we used when running experiments.
[0] S0: FORMAT=27
[0] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57
[0] S2: AIR_SPEED=250
[0] S3: NETID=36
[0] S4: TXPOWER=30
[0] S5: ECC=0
[0] S6: MAVLINK=1
[0] S7: OPPRESEND=0
[0] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000
[0] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000
[0] S10: NUM_CHANNELS=50
[0] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=50
[0] S12: LBT_RSSI=0
[0] S13: MANCHESTER=0
[0] S14: RTSCTS=0
[0] S15: NODEID=0
[0] S16: NODEDESTINATION=1
[0] S17: SYNCANY=0
[0] S18: NODECOUNT=2

[1] S0: FORMAT=27
[1] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57
[1] S2: AIR_SPEED=250
[1] S3: NETID=36
[1] S4: TXPOWER=30
[1] S5: ECC=0
[1] S6: MAVLINK=1
[1] S7: OPPRESEND=0
[1] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000
[1] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000
[1] S10: NUM_CHANNELS=50
[1] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=100
[1] S12: LBT_RSSI=0
[1] S13: MANCHESTER=0
[1] S14: RTSCTS=0
[1] S15: NODEID=1
[1] S16: NODEDESTINATION=0
[1] S17: SYNCANY=0
[1] S18: NODECOUNT=2
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In figure 6.6, we show RSSI and noise for both remote and local nodes that
correspond to the same experiment. It is worth mentioning that we were able to achieve
over 15 miles of robust communication on the river between base station and one surfing
Jetyak.

Figure 6.6 : RSSI and Noise results values in Point-to-Point scenarios
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6.3.2 Multipoint (3-way)
We setup one base-station and two remote nodes (Jetyaks) to evaluate a three-way
communication. Upon adding another Jetyak to serve as an extra remote node, we notice
that communications get sluggish and drop pretty quickly (within few meters) when using
same exact configurations introduced in the previous point-to-point scenarios. Several
configurations were tested to find the optimal values where base station was setup to
transmit by broadcast sometimes and transmit to a particular node ID some others. At the
later case, the third node was setup to be enabled to SYNC any node or communications in
the air. A working configuration sample is shown below, where all nodes were setup to
broadcast at the same time. Although this configuration works fine nevertheless it showed
high sensitivity to distance and environmental noise. Fig 6.7 shows RSSI and noise value
for the setup where all nodes were broadcasting at same time. It is obvious that nodes
suffered from noise created by neighboring nodes when they transmit at same time
[0] S0: FORMAT=27
[0] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57
[0] S2: AIR_SPEED=64
[0] S3: NETID=60
[0] S4: TXPOWER=30
[0] S5: ECC=0
[0] S6: MAVLINK=1
[0] S7: OPPRESEND=0
[0] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000
[0] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000
[0] S10: NUM_CHANN=50
[0] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=20
[0] S12: LBT_RSSI=0
[0] S13: MANCHESTER=0
[0] S14: RTSCTS=1
[0] S15: NODEID=0
[0] S16:
NODEDESTINATION=65535
[0] S17: SYNCANY=1
[0] S18: NODECOUNT=3

[2] S0: FORMAT=27
[2] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57
[2] S2: AIR_SPEED=64
[2] S3: NETID=60
[2] S4: TXPOWER=30
[2] S5: ECC=0
[2] S6: MAVLINK=1
[2] S7: OPPRESEND=0
[2] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000
[2] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000
[2] S10: NUM_CHANN=50
[2] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=40
[2] S12: LBT_RSSI=0
[2] S13: MANCHESTER=0
[2] S14: RTSCTS=1
[2] S15: NODEID=2
[2] S16:
NODEDESTINATION=65535
[2] S17: SYNCANY=1
[2] S18: NODECOUNT=3
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[1] S0: FORMAT=27
[1] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57
[1] S2: AIR_SPEED=64
[1] S3: NETID=60
[1] S4: TXPOWER
[1] S5: ECC=0
[1] S6: MAVLINK=1
[1] S7: OPPRESEND=0
[1] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000
[1] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000
[1] S10: NUM_CHANN=50
[1] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=40
[1] S12: LBT_RSSI=0
[1] S13: MANCHESTER=0
[1] S14: RTSCTS
[1] S15: NODEID=1
[1] S16:
NODEDESTINATION=65535
[1] S17: SYNCANY=1
[1] S18: NODECOUNT=3

Figure 6.7: RSSI and Noise values for local and remote nodes in Multipoint scenario
obtained from mission planner (Top) and RFD-Design SW (Bottom)
6.4 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we discussed and showed the possibility to use the ISM band 900MHz
for multipoint communications. Although, the data rate had to be dropped significantly
(more than half), to withstand the noise created from environment and neighboring nodes,
nevertheless, some tuning is possible to enhance the quality of the communications. The
key observation from all experiments tat were conducted is that one needs to decide the
size of the communication area, number of communicating nodes, data exchange rate, and
the tolerated error. We also were able to achieve a better result in multipoint scenarios in
term of data error rate when adjusting the NODE_DESTINATION and SYNC_ANY
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parameters. However, the exchanged data rate was also dropped which means fewer data
were able to be exchanged. In short, using the 900MHz to for monitoring nodes in an open
area is cheap and possible solution in LOS environments.
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APPENDIX A
EVALUATION TOOL- TOWARD A REALISTIC VANET SIMULATOR
In [24-25] authors have surveyed different network simulators that support building
and simulating VANET. They evaluated at least 10 different simulators in terms of
protocols and services in a variety of conditions (number of nodes, traffic, congestion,
SNR, fading, path loss, etc). Based on the comparative study [24-25], we choose to use
National Chiao Tung University Network Simulator (NCTUns) as an evaluation tool for
this work. The simulator was originally developed as a network simulator with unique
capabilities. Several releases have been introduced to accommodate new technology as
they evolved. In this work we use the sixth release of NCTUns 6.0 that incorporate traffic
simulation (e.g., road network construction and vehicle mobility models).

A. Modules
Several modules are supported by NCTUns that makes it flexible as an evaluation tool.
NCTUns also support the integration of 802.11p/WAVE standards to provide a realistic
evaluation results. Nevertheless, NCTUns also supports creating, modifying or adding
modules to the workspace.
B. Nodes Parameters & mobility
When simulating VANET, we need to consider the different nodes (RSUs, OBUs).
Each node need to be configured differently since different standards are available for
different nodes. For instance, only RSUs can advertise on the CCH and announce
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available services on different SCHs. Also, RSUs can't have any mobility models since
they are infrastructural towers. On the other hand, NCTUns two different mobility models
to support the mobility of vehicles nodes (agent-controlled \& Module-controlled).
Additionally, NCTUns give free access through its GUI to adjust different parameters for
each node (signal power, receiving sensitivity, fading models, obstacles, speed, direction
etc.) which is supported by NCTUns.
C. Channel Model
Simulating using NCTUns enables user to choose from two kinds of channel models:
Theoretical and Empirical. Within theoretical channel model NCTUns supports three
theoretical path-loss models (free-space, two-ray ground, and free space and shadowing).
Additionally, Rayleigh, Ricean and no-fading are also supported by the simulator to choose
from as fading mode.
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